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A SYMPTOMATIC APPROACH TO SECURITIES FRAUD:
THE SEC'S PROPOSED RULE 15C2-6 AND
THE BOILER ROOM
THE- rules adopted by the Securities Exchange Commission, together with
regulatory measures of registered stock exchanges and dealer associations, con-
tribute to the control of a profession involving particularly severe risks of high
pressure fraud perpetrated upon an unknowledgeable clientele. The Com-
mission, consistent with the mandate of the Securities Acts,' has exercised its
control over the profession -through a regulatory framework emphasizing the
need for proper disclosure of relevant information to the client about the
securities to be offered or sold to him. Value is not a determinant of Com-
mission decision. The risk is taken by the client But to insure that the client
is equipped to make his choice rationally the Commission requires that the facts
facilitating that choice be disclosed, and fully and fairly stated. The pur-
chaser who is not already informed about a stock depends upon the securities
profession to perform two functions: the gathering of relevant information
about the security and the transmission of this information to him so that he
can make reasoned choices. Such dependence is particularly likely to exist
where the transaction is initiated by solicitation on the part of a broker or
dealer. If the broker or dealer, in his efforts to secure sales, either fails to in-
vestigate or misrepresents, affirmatively or by omission the information he has
gathered, the unknowing or deceived client may suffer injuries from risks
which he should not be considered to have assumed.
BOILER Room FRAUD
Currently troubling the SEC is a particularly virulent form of fraudulent
activity, the so-called "boiler room" technique,2 whose success and objection-
ability arise from its operators' failure to perform these two functions of the
disclosure concept. The boiler room enjoyed its fastest growth during the in-
flationary period accompanying the Korean War, when new investors flooded
the stock market.3 The flow of customers included a mass of credulous ama-
teurs who proved receptive to devious sales methods of unethical dealers and
brokers. The "boiler room" metaphor springs from the cacaphony and sweat
created by numerous salesmen simultaneously delivering high pressure sales
pitches into rows of telephones. 4 Many boiler rooms have been run on an elabor-
1. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1958) ; Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1958).
2. A group of deceptive tactics including wild predictions of market price increases by
fast talking salesmen over the long-distance telephone. 25 SEC Am¢. REP. 2 (1959);
LivirGsTo, THE AaX .mnmc SToci0HoDER 266 (1958). See generally SEC, SPEC AL STUDY
oF SEcuRITErs MAREs, Ch. III B, pp. 51-56, (April 3, 1963).
3. Ibid.
4. A boiler room is a small crowded offie .... The drab walls are lined with desks on
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ate scale: one operation terminated by the SEC occupied fifteen rooms in which
forty-seven salesmen and clerks ran up a telephone bill of $40,000 a month on
fifty telephones.5 But most boiler rooms are not so ambitiously staffed or sup-
plied ;6 all that is necessary to achieve breadth of operation is the telephone.1
Success is based on fast turnover at inflated prices. The operators conducting the
schemes deal exclusively in low-priced, little known stocks.8 They make no effort
to give prospective customers accurate information on which to base a reasonable
which sit telephones, shrouded with hoods. On the table are out-of-town telephone
books.... As soon as a prospect is nibbling, the salesman ducks his head under the
hood to block out the chatter of other hard-pushing salesmen. Thus he can talk real
quiet and confidential-like.
LVINGSTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 266. The attempt to diminish noise by makeshift
methods appears to be a characteristic of intense boiler room campaigns. Another ludicrous
setting is described:
On each desk sat a wooden packing crate, upended, with a telephone inside each
crate. A salesman would sit with head and shoulders inside the crate, telephoning
potential suckers all over the United States.
CoRMI=R, WALL STRE's SHADY Sowe 167 (1962), regarding a notorious boiler room sales
operation reported in Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 SEC 683 (1957). For a report of the
"wooden cubicles" used in a Canadian operation see Timbers & Pollack, Extraditions froil
Canada to the United States for Securities Fraud: Frustration of the National Policies of
Both Countries, 24 FoRDHiAm L. Rxv. 301, 314 n.80 (1955).
But boiler room facilities need not be limited to the crowded, cellular type described
above. Not infrequently salesmen make their calls from hotel rooms and apartments, 25
SEC ANN. REP. 3 (1959), and it would be possible to carry on a boiler room campaign
from a brokerage with ordinary physical characteristics, cf. note 31, 2d para., infra.
5. Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 SEC 683, 687 (1957). In addition to telephone ex-
penses, the monthly postage costs to the broker averaged $3,200. Ibid. Barnett & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, July 5, 1960, p. 3, n.3 (telephone bill of $3,000
and $6,000 for two months) ; Midland Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6524, April 10, 1961, p. 3, n.3 (telephone bill over twenty-two month period almost $50,000).
The high operating expenses of boiler rooms are considered by the SEC to be significantly
responsible for increasing high-pressure and misleading selling methods which "are almost
essential if a sufficient number of sales are to be made, at prices sufficiently above the cost
of doing business, so as to result in a profitable operation." SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 6885, Aug. 16, 1962, p. 3 .
6. See 25 SEC ANN. REP. 3 (1959). See also Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1962, p.
3, col. 2.
7. In one operation sales were made over the phone to "all sections of the country and
in practically every state... ." Best Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6282, June 3, 1960, p. 3. Midland Sec. Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6524, April 10, 1960, p. 3 ("throughout the United States") ; Keith Richard Sec. Corp., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5988, June 17, 1959, p. 4 ("in at least 30 states").
In D.H. Victor & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6562, May 17, 1961, p.
3, six out-of-state witnesses testified, and in Biltmore Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 6394, Oct. 17, 1960, p. 3, five appeared. The wide range of boiler room
operations and the necessity of contacting witnesses in several different states highlight
difficulties and expenses of acquiring proof in boiler room cases. See 22 SEC ANN. 1TP. 3
(1956).




decision,9 and they may not have bothered even to secure the information for
themselves ;"o instead, they use the psychological pressure of long distance calls
and selling techniques designed to encourage hasty decisions founded on ground-
less promises of quick profits.11 The psychological impact is heightened by selec-
tion of stocks from glamour industries: drugs,'- communications and elec-
tronics,13 plastics,' 4 oil,15 uranium,16 mining and exploration," aircraft,18 and
bowling alleys.' 9
The sales campaign typically begins with the distribution of brochures,20
9. Sometimes the information is not available from sources other than the issuing com-
pany. For instance, in Theodore A. Landau, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6792,
Apr. 30 1962, the broker sold unregistered securities in violation of § 5 of the Securities Act,
48 Stat. 77 (1954), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
10. E.g., Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6346, July 11,
1962, p. 4, in which salesmen said they were unaware of losses sustained by the issuing com-
pany in whose securities they were specializing.
11. Best Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960, p. 3.
12. N. Pinsker & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6401, Oct. 21, 1960.
13. Barnett & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, July 5, 1960 (tele-
vision antennas) ; Alexander Reid & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727,
Feb. 8, 1962 (machine designed to transmit facsimile of documents over telephone wires) ;
Best Sec., Inc, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960 (telephone
company).
14. Keith Richard Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5988, June 17,
1959.
15. A.G. Bellin Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5966, May 18,
1959; Leonard Burton Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978, June 4,
1959; Midland Sec. Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6524, April 10, 1961;
D.H. Victor & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6562, May 17, 1961.
16. W.T. Anderson Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6177, Feb. 9, 1960.
17. N. Sims Organ & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6495, March 14,
1961.
18. SEC v. Rapp, 304 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1962).
19. Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962.
The use of the glamour industry as a lure is, of course, not merely a contemporary
phenomenon. As the 1925 President of the New York Stock Exchange commented on
securities swindles,
Every successful new invention-the automobile, the radio or the latest electrical
device-is immediately seized upon by a swarm of promoters whose only desire is to
unload fradulent securities on a wave of public enthusiasm. The outward forms
adopted by swindlers to camouflage their operations are continually changing. One
year the public is invited to sink its savings in alleged oil drillings, or new inventions,
or foreign exchange trading. The next year it may be land speculation, rotten
mortgages, wildcat mining ventures, or security and commodity bucketshops. Yet,
under all these outward and rapidly changing forms, the swindling evil itself per-
sists and even grows stronger in the land from year to year.
Smx.xoxs, COOEPRATION AGAixsT SEcURrTY FRAUns 29 (1925).
20. Mac Robbins & Co., supra note 19, at 5. Newspaper advertising is also used. SEC
v. Seipel, CCH FED. Suc. L. REP. f 90735, p. 2 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1954), aff'd per curiam,
229 F2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Rollnick, 91 F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir. 1937).
Newspaper columnists and market advisory services have also been induced to stoke the
boiler room fires by writing optimistic reports of issues. Wise, The World of Alexander
Guterma, Fortune Magazine, Dec. 1959, 144, 148.
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occasionally prepared by advertising firms,2' intended to create an inflated im-
pression of the prospects of the issuing company. The brochures are mailed
to persons whose names are selected at random from out-of-town telephone
books 22 or appear on lists purchased from directory concerns or mail list
specialists.2 3 Favored lists contain names of doctors, farmers, small business-
men, housewives, teachers, and widows. 24 The second step, in what has been
called a "'boiler room' blitz,"12 5 is a telephone call to the brQchure recipient
by a salesman-known to his associates as a "coxey" or "opener" 20-who
generally makes preliminary statements exaggerating the prospects of the stock
advertised in the brochure.2 7 Following this opening move a second salesman
-the "loader" or "dynamiter" 2 8- may take over and attempt to convey the
impression that he is an experienced broker whom the buyer can trust. Oc-
casionally a third salesman-the "reloader" 2 0-will follow up a completed sale
by encouraging the customer to make additional purchases. Although the sales-
men involved represent themselves as experienced brokers, intimately ac-
quainted with the company whose stock they offer and concerned with the
buyer's investment needs, the claimed expertise and concern are not demon-
strated by their actions. Often the salesmen have had no previous experience
either with securities or business generally,80 and receive limited training and
21. Albion Securities Co., Official Report of Proceedings Before the SEC; Special
Study of the Securities Market 1290, May 18, 1962.
22. LiviNGST N, op. cit. supra note 2, at 266.
23. Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 SEC 683, 687 (1957); Albion Securities Co.,
supra note 21, at 1285.
24. Albion Securities Co., supra note 21, at 1285-86; 22 SEc. ANN. REP. 4 (1956)
CoRmiER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 163; Klaw, The Great Sweet Grass Swindle, Fortune
Magazine, Aug. 1957, 134, 135.
25. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961).
26. Klaw, supra note 24, at 175.
27. In the Sweet Grass sales campaign the "coxey" was given a canned sales pitch:
... Mr. Smith, as sure as I am talking with you on this telephone this stock will reach
ten to twelve dollars in the next sixty to ninety days.... I am putting my clients into
Great Sweet Grass and many of these people have been with me for the past fourteen
years .... I beg of you for 1 per cent of your confidence; I promise I will earn the
other 99 per cent.
Ibid. For excerpts from another conversation between "coxey" and customer, see CoRmiit,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 164-65.
28. Klaw, vupra note 24, at 175. See Windels, Our Securities Markets-Sojue SEC
Problems and Techniques, 8 N.Y.L.F. 169, 178 (1962).
29. Timbers & Pollack, supra note 4, at 314.
30. In SEC v. Rapp, 304 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1962), it was held that the broker "hired
men with no knowledge of the intricate business of securities ... thereby ensuring that the
accuracy of their representations would be wholly fortuitous. . . ." Id. at 790. In Albion
Securities Co., supra note 21, salesmen were trained by reporting to the office and listening
to other salesmen for a week or two, and supervision appeared to be concerned exclusively
with their high-pressure technique. See id. at 1278. See generally Wall Street Journal, May
21, 1962, p. 5, col. 2 and Aug. 17, 1962, p. 6, col. 1. For a full study of the qualifications of
securities salesmen, see SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECUaRES MARKrS, ch. II C, (April 3,
1414 [Vol, 72:1411
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supervision beyond boiler room technique. 3 ' Common misrepresentations by
these supersalesmen include unfounded predictions of price increases,m ex-
travagant exaggerations of facts concerning the product,33 hints of unnamed
developments,3 half truths used to distort material information, 3 groundless
sfatements of impending mergers 30 or imminent listings on a national e-x-
1963). For a review of recent state regulatory measures directed at this problem, see
Lefkowitz, New York: Criminal Infiltration of the Securities Industry, Annals, May, 1963,
p. 5 1.
31. J. Logan & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6348, July 9, 1962. See
Albion Securities Co., supra note 21, at 1278. For an analysis of training by firms not mem-
bers of the New York Stock Exchange, see SEC. SPEcrAL SrTrY oF SEcumrrms MARrm,
ch. II C, 35-47,. (April 3, 1963).
Presumbly because of the increase in branch operations, supervision is lax even among
major members of the New York Stock Exchange. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith became involved in a sale of securities in the spring of 1961 that has many of the
markings of a boiler room operation. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Official
Report of Proceedings Before the SEC; Special Study of the Securities Market 832, May
16, 1962. In response to a full page advertisement in the Los Angeles Mirror regarding a
company, Aquafilter, which manufactured a cigarette filter that was supposed to "excel all
others? in the removal of tars and nicotine, a Merrill Lynch account executive contacted the
firm. After attending a cocktail party given by Aquafilter for "members of the financial
community," he and other salesmen began to push Aquafilter stock aggressively. Id. at
908-09. The salesmen claimed that there was a plant producing filters in Connecticut, and
that net profits would increase considerably in a short time. Id. at 923. Actually there vas
no plant, and the salesmen had no information on which to base their speculations. Wall
Street Journal, May 17, 1962, p. 32, col. 1. The over-the-counter price of Aquafilter, which
had risen from $2.5 to $6.50 during the Merrill Lynch campaign, fell to !.50. Ibid.
32. Biltmore Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6394, Oct. 17, 1960,
p. 3 (prediction that stock price "'would go up to about six points' that evening" from
between 14 and I4) ; Alexander Reid & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6727, Feb. 8, 1962, p. 3 (that stock would rise from below $2 to as high as M20 within a year).
In these and many similar cases the issuing companies showed operating losses and little
promise that their market price would rise without stimulation from the boiler room.
33. N. Pinsker & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6401, Oct. 21, 1960,
pp. 5-6 (salesmen made groundless claims of the development of "another wonder drug" by
the issuer, and of a "cure for cancer which would be publicly announced as soon as confirma-
tion was received from Denmark"'); Midland Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 6524, April 10, 1961, p. 4-5 (salesmen claimed that the issuer, a petroleum
company, had just "brought in a 'gusher."' In fact, the wells were producing only a trickle
and almost no income).
34. Biltmore Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6394, Oct. 17,
1960, p. 3 ("something is brewing") ; Ale.-ander Reid & Co., SEC Securities Ecchange Act
Release No. 6727, Feb. 8, 1962, p. 3 (salesman reported that "'tremendous things' were
happening," but that he was sworn to secrecy).
35. E.g., Midland Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6524, April 10,
1961, pp. 3-4, in which a salesman told a customer that the issuer had acquired oil and gas
rights in or near Canadian oil fields, but failed to add that the company's holdings had under-
gone constant reduction and resulted in practically no income.
36. E.g., N. Pinsker & Co., SEC Securities E-xchange Act Release No. 6401, Oct. 21,
1960, p. 5; Best Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960,
141519631
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change,37 and unqualified material misstatements.88 In sum, there is usually
a failure to disclose and a failure to investigate; the salesmen frequently know
little about the stock they are selling and care even less about their clients'
financial needs.89
PRESENT SEC CONTROLS
To combat these undesirable sales tactics the Commission and the courts
have relied upon the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts. Under these
sections it is unlawful, in connection with an offer or sale of securities in inter-
state commerce, to obtain money or property by making
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading....40
The earliest cases under the anti-fraud provisions held there is an implied
representation by a broker or dealer that he will deal fairly with his customers
in accordance with the standards of the profession.
41
Beginning in the mid-1950's, the SEC began an enforcement campaign
specifically directed at applying these concepts of fair dealing to the growing
problem of boiler rooms. 42 The Commission was aided, moreover, by the
37. E.g., A.G. Bellin Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5966, May
18, 1959, p. 5; Peerless-New York, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6193,
p. 3, Feb. 26, 1960.
38. SEC v. Rapp, 304 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1962), and Midland Sec., Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 6524, April 10, 1961, p. 4 (salesmen falsely claimed that the
issuers had or were about to receive government contracts) ; D.H. Victor & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6562, May 17, 1961, p. 3 (that issuer was already pay-
ing dividends); N. Sims Organ & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6495,
March 14, 1961, p. 3 (that brokerage had been in business for 27-28 years, while actually it
had been in business for less than three years).
39. E.g., Barnett & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, July 5, 1960,
p. 4 .
40. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §
77q(a) (2) (1958). Other anti-fraud provisions applied in boiler room cases include Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958) and §
15(c) (1), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1958), and Rules lob-5 and 15c1-2
[17 CFR 240.10b-5 and 15cl-2 (1949)] thereunder. The provisions are similar in language,
but are distinguished by their coverage. Section 17(a) refers to "offer or sale," while §
10b-5 to "purchase or sale." Section 15(c) (1) applies specifically to brokers and dealers,
while § 17(a) and Rule 10(b) extend to "any person." See generally 3 Loss, Stcuniis
RIEGULATION 1421-30 (2d ed. 1961).
41. Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388-89 (1939). Succeeding cases applied the concept
of fair dealing to specific activities. E.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d
Cir. 1943), in which it was held that it was not fair dealing for brokers to charge customers
prices unrelated to the prevailing market price. See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. slepra note
40, at 1482-93.
42. Although there are isolated cases before the 1950's, e.g., U.S. v. Rollnick, 91 F.2d 111
(2d Cir. 1937), the boiler room problem and SEC attempts at control appear to have be-
come most intense during the past decade. In 1956 the SEC estimated that there were 40
1416 [Vol, 72:1411
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broad interpretation of fraud in the securities field, an interpretation stemming
from the "intricate merchandise" 43 character of securities and the dearth of
relevant knowledge the usual client possesses.44 The boiler room practices
which the Commission and the courts found to be prohibited by the anti-fraud
provisions included predictions without an adequate basis,45 knowing misstate-
ments, 46 omission to state material facts4 7 and reckless repetition of unverified
self-serving statements of issuers. 48 "Fair dealing" thus would seem to include
elements of both duty to investigate and duty to inform on the part of the
dealer or broker.
Enforcement difficulties have arisen, however, in detecting and proving
violations. Since potential witnesses are spread throughout the country,40 the
administrative difficulty and costs of investigating boiler room cases are par-
ticularly great. The Commission's normal method of governing broker-dealers
is by a program of periodic inspectionr ° Further inspections may result from
the investor complaints which constitute a major source of information about
violations.61 During fiscal year 1961, however, the SEC inspected less than
one-third of the more than 5,000 practicing broker-dealers.52 Although this
boiler rooms operating in New York City, employing a total of between 400 and 500 sales-
men. Kaw, supra note 24, at 135. While boiler room activity may have reached its peak in
the late 1950's, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Aug. 17, 1962, p. 20, col. 6, there have been more than
thirty boiler room revocation and suspension rulings rendered by the SEC since January,
1960, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 17,1962, p. 6, col. 1.
In many of the cases during the early part of this period, the securities that reached
the boiler rooms for peddling to the public already had a history of devious and illicit pro-
motion. See generally Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957) ; CoRIm, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 159-72; Wise, The World of Alexander Guterina, Fortune, Dec. 1959, 144;
Kiaw, The World of Lowell Birrell, Fortune, Nov. 1959, 170; Klaw, The Great Sweet Grass
Swindle, Fortune, Aug. 1957, 134. The issuer frauds appear to have been successfully con-
trolled. Coasn op. cit. supra note 4, at 171.
In New York, state authorities, both legislative and executive, have also been engaged in
stepped-up enforcement campaign against the boiler room. Lefkowit26 New York: Crininal
Infiltration of the Securities Industry, Annals, May, 1963, p. 51.
43. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933).
44. See Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Charles Hughes & Co. v.
SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) ; 3 Loss, op. cit.
.supra note 40, at 1435.
45. See cases cited in note 37 supra.
46. E.g., Biltmore Sec. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6394, Oct.
17, 1960; Leonard Burton Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5978, June 4,
1959, p. 5.
47. E.g., N. Pinsker & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6401, Oct. 21,
1960, p. 7 .
48. E.g., Best Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960;
Barnett & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6310, July 5, 1960.
49. See note 7 supra.
50. Loomis, Enforcement Problems Under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 Bus. LAw.
665, 674 (1959).
51. SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuarriEs M uars, c. III B, 134, April 3, 1963.
52. 27 SEC Ax. REP. 4-5 (1961).
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program has expanded during the past few years,5 3 it has been unable to match
the vast increase in investors, securities salesmen, and branch operations.0
Furthermore, the problems of proof of violation once inspection has occurred
are considerable; in order to establish evidence of boiler room misrepresenta-
tion, it is necessary not only to ascertain what was communicated, but also
"to tie back those representations made by voice over the long-distance tele-
phone to the boiler room, and to assemble some evidence concerning the issuer
in order to make a showing as to the false or misleading character of the repre-
sentations."5 5 In addition to these problems of proof, the Commission has had
difficulty in convincing appellate judges that salesmen employing boiler room
tactics violated the Securities Acts.
5 6
PRoPosED RULE 15c2-6
Because of the difficulties of continuing its program of halting boiler room
activities by this protracted adjudicatory method, the Commission is in the
process of developing, by exercise of its rule-making power, other means for
the elimination of the boiler room. Proposed Rule 15c2-6 " would seek to avoid
administrative proof problems by interdiction of a general course of business
which, though in itself not necessarily illegal, is identified by the SEC as a
53. Id. at 1-2; Wall Street Journal, May 8, 1962, p. 3, col. 2.
54. 27 SEC ANN. REP. 4-5 (1961).
55. Loomis, supra note 50, at 673; Windels, supra note 28, at 178. Furthermore, since
"inspectors mostly confine their activities to an examination of books and records and do
not routinely uncover evidence of misrepresentation or high pressure in the sale of securi-
ties, as they do not generally listen to the sales presentation or question any customers."
SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuarIEs MARKETS, ch. III B, 135-36, April 3, 1963.
Another problem is lack of coordination between enforcement agencies, particularly those
of the various states and the National Association of Securities Dealers. Some state security
law administrators have claimed that their enforcement procedures were hampered by the
NASD's refusal to supply information the Association had already gathered. Duplication of
effort by the various agencies has also been criticized. Wall Street Journal, May 22, 1962,
p. 2, col. 2. For a discussion of international enforcement difficulties, see Timbers & Pollack,
supra note 4; ComIirE, supra note 4, at 168-71; 26 SEC ANN. REP. 202-04 (1960). The in-
ternational problems appear to be decreasing. 27 SEC. ANN. REP. 174-75 (1961). See general-
ly Loomis, op. cit. supra note 50, and Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1962, p. 5, col. 2; April
30, 1962, p. 5, col. 2; May 8, 1962, p. 3, col. 1; May 17, 1962, p. 32, col. 1 ; May 24, 1962, p. 5,
col. 1; May 28, 1962, p. 28, col. 1.
56. Remand by a federal court to an administrative agency for clarification of the
agency's opinion is not unusual. In a peak period of boiler room activity, however, time-
consuming exchanges of administrative and judicial opinions had a burdensome effect on
the SEC enforcement effort. One case, in which the SEC suspended a securities salesman,
who had been involved in a boiler room operation, for making predictions without an ade-
quate basis, was on appeal, on remand and in the process of rewriting, and again on appeal
for over two years. It was recently affirmed. Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Releases No. 6462, Feb. 6, 1961, and 6498, March 16, 1961 ; Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116
(2d Cir. 1961) ; Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July
11, 1962, aff'd Berko v. SEC, No. 27774, 2d Cir., April 9, 1963. See also Kahn v. SEC, 297
F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961) ; SEC v. Rapp, 304 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1962).
57. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6885, Aug. 16, 1962.
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usual incident of fraudulent transactions. s The rule 1; would make it unlawful
for a broker or a dealer to offer or sell certain equity securities at a price of $10
or less by telephone unless he establishes that the transaction is exempt under
the rule. Once it were shown that non-exempt securities were involved in such
58. The rule would be adopted pursuant to Section 15(c) (2) of the Securities Exchange
Act, authorizing the SEC to make rules to
define... and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative and such quotations as are fictitious.
48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (2) (1958).
59. Proposed Rule 15c2-6, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6885, Aug. 16,
1962:
(a) It shall constitute a "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice" within
the meaning of Section 15(c) (2) of the Act for any broker or dealer to offer or sell
any equity security at a price of $10 or less by telephone to any person other than a
broker, dealer, institutional customer or regular customer, unless such broker or
dealer establishes that either the security or the transaction falls within one of the
following categories of securities or transactions:
(1) Any security, the issuer of which (A) has, as evidenced by a profit and
loss statement certified by an independent public accountant, had net income in
its most recent fiscal year or, if such fiscal year ended within 120 days prior to
the offer or sale of such security by the broker or dealer and a certified profit and
loss statement is not available, the last preceding fiscal year, and (B) is either
currently filing reports pursuant to Sections 13 or 15(d) of the Act, or Section
14 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, or Section 30 of the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, or is a company in respect of which there is
published in a recognized securities manual a list of the names of the issuer's
officers and directors, a balance sheet as of a date within 16 months of the offering
or sale, and a profit and loss statement for either the fiscal year ending on that
date or the most recent fiscal year. Such balance sheet and profit and loss state-
ment must have been certified by an independent public accountant, but it shall
not be a requirement that the certificate of such accountant be contained in any
such securities manual;
(2) Isolated transactions not a part of any concentrated sales efforts by the
broker-dealer; or
(3) A transaction which is not solicited by the broker or dealer; or
(4) A security registered under the Securities Act of 1933, which is offered or
sold at a time when delivery of a prospectus is required by Section 5 thereof, and
as to which a prospectus meeting the requirements of that Act is delivered to
the purchaser in accordance with the provisions of that Act.
(b) The prohibitions of paragraph (a) of this rule shall not apply to any specific
transaction which, upon prior written request, the Commission exempts as not
being comprehended within the purposes of this rule.
(c) For the purposes of this rule:
(1) The term "institutional customer" means a bank; a trust company; an
insurance company; a pension, welfare, profit sharing or similar fund; an in-
vestment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940; or any
other similar financial institution.
(2) The term "regular customer" means any person with whose written agree-
ment the broker or dealer is maintaining a general account or special cash ac-
count as provided in Regulation T, and who has purchased securities of two or
more different issuers at different times within the past year from or through
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a transaction-a showing itself facilitated by the rule's new and extensive
record-keeping requirements-the alleged offender would have the burden of
proving his acts not to have been subject to the rule. Exemptions are specified
for transactions which involve brokers, dealers, institutional customers or
"regular customers" or else are isolated, unsolicited, or involve certain securi-
ties which are either registered or described in a "recognized" investment
manual. If the proscribed activities occur, the broker's registration may be
revoked 60 and the salesman may be suspended from the practice of selling
securities.61
Strong criticism that the proposed rule casts its net too broadly has been
such broker or dealer in such accounts, unless such purchases have been solicited
to avoid the operation of this rule.
(3) The term "recognized securities manual" means a securities manual which
has been published continuously for a period of 5 years or more prior to the offer
or sale by an investment adviser registered as such under the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940.
(d) Every broker or dealer shall maintain the following and records with regard to
transactions in any equity security offered or sold by telephone at a price of $10 or less
to any person other than a broker, dealer, institutional customer or regular customer:
(1) A separate daily record for each person connected with such broker or
dealer who offered or sold the security showing: (A) the date and time of each
such telephone call, (B) the name of the person connected with such broker or
dealer who offered the security to the customer or prospective customer, and the
telephone number and location of the telephone used by such person, (C) the
name, address and telephone number of the customer or prospective customer to
whom the security was offered, (D) whether such telephone call was initiated
by such broker or dealer or by the customer or prospective customer, (E) the
title and price of the security offered, and (F) the number of shares, or units, if
any, purchased by the customer and the price thereof. Such record shall be
signed by the person whose offers and sales are recorded thereon, and shall be
approved and signed by a partner, officer, or office manager of such broker or
dealer, or by such broker or dealer if a sole proprietor.
(2) A copy of every list of names, any part of which is used by any person
connected with such broker or dealer in identifying customers or prospective
customers to whom securities might be offered or sold, which copy shall also in-
dicate the source of any such list.
(3) Copies of all telephone toll slips reflecting all toll telephone calls charged to
such broker or dealer.
The provisions of paragraph (d) of this rule shall not apply to:
(1) any transaction executed on a national securities exchange, or
(2) the offering or sale of a security registered under the Securities Act of 1933
which is offered or sold at a time when delivery of a prospectus is required by
Section 5 thereof, and as to which a prospectus meeting the requirements of that
Act is delivered to the purchaser in accordance with the requirements of that Act.
60. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b), 49 Stat. 1378 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)
(1958). He may be suspended or expelled from a registered securities association under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A(1) (2), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b) (8) (1958).
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A(b) (4), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (4) (1958).
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voiced by the securities industry and other interested parties.02 It is charged
that a symptomatic approach, which focuses rigidly upon telephone sales of
low-priced stock-a mode of transaction common to all securities sellers--and
requires burdensome record-keeping efforts, may affect legitimate as well as
illegitimate business as a result of favoring expediency of proof over functional
concern for discriminate enforcement.
Taken without its exemptions, the regulation, making any telephoned offer
to sell an equity security at a price of $10 or less a "fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative act or practice,"0 3 covers a vast number of ordinary, non-fraudu-
lent sales and practices. The $10 or less cutoff price doubtless includes the
great majority of boiler room offerings, but it also reaches many investments
not normally subject to the fraudulent practices sought to be outlawed by the
rule.0 And the telephone is one of the modem securities salesman's most
essential tools, offering him both speed of communication suitable for a
rapidly fluctuating market "and a form of personal approach invaluable as a
sales technique. Assuming that attempts to evade coverage by unit sales cs or
by injection of non-telephonic approaches into the sales campaign can be
frustrated through a liberal construction of the rule, the resultant inclusive-
ness might have a detrimental impact on legitimate market activity. Restric-
tions on telephone sales would doubtless reduce turnover, and, hence, interest
and price of all securities in the affected range.66 Not only might individual
issues suffer unnatural declines in market price due to discrimination result-
ing from the rule, but the general activity of the market, particularly with
respect to the traditionally low-priced issues of new companies seeking venture
capital, might also be made more sluggish. The expense in time and effort in
conforming to the new and extensive bookkeeping provisions G- might con-
tribute further to these depressing effects. Presumably in order to avoid these
effects while achieving evidentiary benefits, the proposed rule attempts to
exempt situations not normally subject to boiler room techniques: securities
presenting relatively less danger of exploitation, persons less likely to be
exploited, and circumstances in which enforcement is not worth the cost.
62. E.g., Letters to the SEC from Wallace H. Fulton, Executive Director, National
Association of Securities Dealers, Oct. 9, 1962; G. Keith Funston, President, New York
Stock Exchange, Oct. 5, 1962; Edwin A. Etherington, President, American Stock Ex-
change, Oct. 12, 1962; Albert Pratt, Investment Bankers Association of America, Oct. 8,
1962; 0. Vance Fasbourg, Special Committee on Securities Regulation, New York City Bar
Association, Sept. 27, 1962.
63. See para. (a) of proposed Rule 15c2-6, supra note 59.
64. During the first quarter of 1963 there were more than 100 issues listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and more than 400 on the American Stock Exchange which sold for
$10 or less. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1963, p. 62, 64, 68 (Exchange Transactions sections).
65. By, for example, offering securities in units of two or more shares at a price of
$11 per unit.
66. Of course, issuers of $10 and under securities can avoid the rule by recapitalizing the
offering their shares at over $10. Thus they would be forced to choose between subjection
to the rule at below $10 prices and selling at higher prices which will be, perhaps, less
attractive to investors.
67. See para. (d) (1) of proposed Rule 15c2-6, mipra note 59.
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The first class of exemptions concerns securities for which the information
a purchaser might desire has been made available. Thus, "a security registered
under the Securities Act of 1933, which is offered or sold at a time when
delivery of a prospectus is required"08 is exempt, as are securities which both
have shown a "net income in [their] most recent fiscal year"0 9 and either are
reporting to the SEC under the Exchange Act or Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act requirements or are reported on to a similar degree in a recognized
securities manual."0 The proposed rule does not demand pre-sale disclosure of
information required to be available;71 but it does have the effect of as-
suring that the information will be generally available prior to sale-in
itself an inhibition to fraud-and the rule assures as minimum protection
either that the purchaser will receive the information soon after sale in the
form of a prospectus, or that the security has a recent history of soundness.
In effect, all stocks listed on national exchanges are exempt 72 if they satisfy
the net income requirement. In the absence of a strict rule of pre-sale dis-
closure, the net profit test compensates somewhat for the fact that mere listing
offers no certainty that the security is an untainted investment. 8 Since all
transactions executed on national exchanges are exempted from the book-
keeping requirements,74 the regulation affects principally over-the-counter is-
sues, which are particularly likely to be subject to fraud.
The prospectus and net income tests are not beyond criticism. Companies
which are exempt from filing reports with the SEC and companies which fulfill
the reporting requirements,"5 but have suffered one lean year among the fat,
might find their prospects and ability to obtain new capital by stock issue un-
realistically darkened by the rule's effects. Such criticism might be avoided by
68. Id. at para (a) (4).
69. Id.atpara. (a) (1) (A).
70. Id. atpara. (a)(1)(B).
,71. Under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 77 (1954), as amended, 15 US.C. §
77e (1958), sales may be made without the seller being required to furnish the buyer with
a prospectus in advance, so long as the prospectus accompanies or precedes delivery of the
security after the sale.
72. Since all listed securities must file reports pursuant to Sections 13 or 15 (d) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 896, 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1938), satis-
fying the requirements of paragraph (a) (1) (A) of the proposed rule, supra note 59.
73. Ownership and the financial setup of a company can change overnight. "We live in
an age of mergers, where shifts of control may take place quickly through such devices as
a negotiated purchase, a sale of assets, a merger, or a stock acquisition." Jennings, The
Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Proteclion, 23 LAW & CONTm'.,
PROB. 193, 217 (1958). Great Sweet Grass and Bon Ami are pertinent examples of listed
securities involved in boiler room transactions. Great Sweet Grass was listed on the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange in 1955, Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683, 685 (1957), and
Bon Ami was listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1956, Wise, The World of Alex-
ander Guterina, Fortune Magazine, Dec. 1959, 144, 154. Guterma, responsible for several
boiler room operations, was the chief executive officer of three corporations listed on the
New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 145.
74. See para. (d), exemption (1), of proposed Rule 15c2-6, supra note 59.
75. Id. at paragraph (a) (1) (B).
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simple amendments of the rule, making it clear that exemptions exist where pros-
pectus-like statements are voluntarily filed and made available to purchasers,-,
or changing the net income test to provide exemption for firms which have
shown a profit trend for a longer term-say, three of the preceding four years.
On the other hand, this class of exemption may also be subjected to criticism as
too inclusive, in the sense that it fails to distinguish between cases where the
client receives the information before completing the transaction and those where
he does not. But the possibility that boiler room type transactions, exempted
from the rule despite the non-disclosure prior to sale, will occur is lessened be-
cause of the availability of information through other sources ;7T moreover, in
such transactions, because the seller must have the information at hand, prosecu-
tion would be easily available under Section 17(a)," s the anti-fraud provision
of the Securities Act. To put conclusive stress on actual pre-sale communication
of the information disclosed might be to put unrealistic strictures on broker be-
havior and to resurrect problems of proof in a new and possibly more difficult
guise.
The second class of exemptions excludes from operation of the rule all trans-
actions involving clients who would not seem to require its protection: brokers,
dealers, financial institutions 79-including insurance companies and pension,
welfare or profit-sharing funds-and "regular customers," s0 defined as "any
person with whose written agreement the broker or dealer is maintaining a
general account or special cash account as provided in Regulation T, and who
has purchased securities in two or more different issues at different times
during the past year from or through [him] ... unless such purchases have
been solicited to avoid the operation of this rule."8' By requiring a past course
of dealing between the broker and investor, the "regular customer" exemption
recognizes that in these circumstances the broker will have become familiar
with his client's financial situation, and, conversely, that the client will have
achieved some investing sophistication through his previous market e.xperience.
Not only, then, is it more likely that a telephoned transaction will be part of
a regular course of business; it is also less likely that the client will be de-
ceived. Although others may well possess financial sophistication, it does not
seem that the "regular customer" exemption could be meaningfully broadened
to include them without including large numbers of purchasers to whom the
inference could not fairly be applied.
The third class of exemptions relates to those transactions where origin or
76. Even though an issuer might claim an exemption from registration, it is SEC policy
to allow him to register an issue as long as he complies with the registration requirements.
(Letter from Irving M. Pollack of the Securities Exchange Commission to the Yale Law
Journal, May 31, 1963.
77. I.e., access to a prospectus or "recognized securities manual."
78. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2) (1958). See text at note
40 supra.
79. See para. (a) of proposed Rule 15c2-6, supra note 59.
80. Ibid.
81. Id. atp ara. (c) (2).
1963] 1423
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
frequency suggest that boiler room techniques are not involved: transactions
not solicited by the broker or dealer ;82 "isolated transactions not a part of any
concentrated sales effort" ;s3 and transactions which the Commission rules,
upon request, not to be within the purposes of the rule.8 4 These are apparently
designed not only to exempt circumstances in which the cost of enforcing the
rule would exceed the utility of enforcement, but also to reduce the uncertainty
felt by the honest broker who will inevitably find himself involved at times in
apparently covered transactions.
Yet these rules, in conjunction with the overall prohibition of telephone
transactions in non-exempt stock, may tend to increase uncertainty to some
degree, for they raise difficult questions about the inclusiveness of the phrase
"offer or sell . . by telephone." 5 It seems clear that standard boiler room
sequences involving mail along with telephonic solicitation are to be included
within the rule, if ready evasion is to be prevented. Thus, a brochure pursued
by a telephone follow-up by the broker, or a brochure which serves to excite
the client to call the broker himself would seem to fall within its scope. This
seems to reduce the exemption for unsolicited transactions to situations in
which the broker acts as no more than an order clerk. He might have serious
doubts about the advisability of cautioning or advising the client who has called
him about a purchase, since such action might turn an unsolicited transaction into
a solicited one; even the transaction executed by telephone after a face-to-face
conference with a client might be subject. The most beneficial as well as the
most scurrilous of professional practices might thus be curbed. But the pos-
sibility that some beneficial transactions will result from customer initiated
transactions would not compel all customer initiated calls to be exempted.
There is still the danger that brochures, while non-violative of the anti-fraud
provisions, may be a potent enough "come-on" to engender the evil the pro-
posed rule is designed to control. And narrow construction of the "unsolicited
transaction" exemption does not foreclose exemptions for non-fraudulent trans-
actions under other rubrics.
The exemption of "isolated transactions not a part of any concentrated sales
efforts" is ambiguous, insofar as "isolated transactions" may be distinguishable
from those which are "part of a concentrated sales effort." If the isolated na-
ture of the transaction is to be given special weight, it is probable that only
transactions in non-exempt issues inadvertently made, or where the exemp-
tion status of the transaction is ambiguous will be excluded from operation of
the proposed rule. By placing greater emphasis upon the phrase "not a part
of any concentrated sales effort," however, increased freedom for legitimate
transactions would seem to be secured. So long as the broker refrains from the
aggressive repetitiveness common to all boiler room operators, he will prob-
ably be exempt from the rule thus interpreted. A substantiality test which
82. Id. at paragraph (a) (3).
83. Id. at para. (a) (2).
84. Id. at para. (b).
85. Id. at para. (a).
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permitted low-intensity solicitation of unknown persons,80 in recognition of the
broker's traditional method of stimulating his trade, is also inferrable from
the exemption. Such an interpretation, resolving the exemption's ambiguity in
favor of broker protection, might seem to involve a return to the proof diffi-
culties attending present, non-rule enforcement. Since brokers engaged in these
transactions would not be exempt from the record-keeping requirements, how-
ever, the SEC would have ready access to substantive indicia of the concerted-
ness of their efforts. Ambiguities with respect to the quantum of substantiality
would seem easily resolved by a program of publication and warning. Thus,
emphasis on the degree of concentration of a sales effort as an exemption
criterion-going to the heart of the objectionability of the boiler room and the
characteristic most essential for its success-would seem a fruitful means of
narrowing the potential overreach of the rule.
Similar benefits might be realized from a broad interpretation of the exemption
"excusing" from the rule transactions cleared by the Commission in advance.
A literal reading, suggesting that clearance must be obtained for each sales
transaction, renders this exemption nugatory. A reading which would entitle
the SEC to exempt on the basis of the stock involved would seem to con-
tradict its policy against commenting on the suitability of particular issues.87
But seemingly possible is a reference to forms of transaction-the most obvious
is the face to face discussion which may be followed up by telephone-which
the SEC could certify as being outside the purposes of the rule. Certainly,
exemptions ought to be available for sales techniques utilizing the telephone
but not presenting the dangers of boiler room operations. If the exemption can
not be read to this effect, it would seem that it should be amended to do so.
Again, proof difficulties introduced do not seem particularly great; in the
example chosen, the fact of face-to-face contact indicates that there will be
little cost and difficulty in obtaining the purchaser's testimony in proceedings
against the broker, as well as little likelihood of need to do so.
In sum, the exemptions are susceptible of a reading which seems to meet
most of the objections to the broad reach of the rule. Remaining within
its prohibitive effect would be concentrated sales transactions by telephone
directed towards inexperienced, unknown persons and involving unreported or
financially insecure securities selling at less than $10. This would seem an apt
description of the boiler room technique; outside of a few uncertainties prob-
ably resolvable in the suggested manner, its application to any particular trans-
actions seems clear.
86. It could be argued that boiler room operations, which depend upon "cold" tele-
phone sales for success, would not survive, while legitimate broker-dealers would be only
minimally affected. Of course, boiler room activities can be carried on successfully by
securities establishments which transact the majority of their business outside the reach
of the proposed rule. "Even though most big time 'boiler rooms' have been put out of
business, . . . their kind of hardselling practices areb eing used by securities concerns 'pur-
ported to be respectable." Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1962, p. S col. 2. Even highly
reputable firms have engaged in boiler room practices. For a report of the activities of one
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith branch office, see note 31 mupra, para. 2.
87. See note 97 infra.
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The record keeping provisions 8 of the rule, however, have a broader im-
pact, imposing extensive bookkeeping burdens with respect to telephone trans-
actions in equities in the less than $10 range. Their main thrust is toward
facilitating investigation and overcoming the problem of proof. An SEC rule
already provides that registered brokers must maintain certain books and
records, including an itemized daily record of all transactions, 8 9 but the exist-
ing rule requires no data on offers, addresses, phone numbers, solicitations,
or dates for completed transactions. Proposed Rule 15c2-6 requires not only
this information, but also a notation of the origin of the phone call (whether
broker or customer), copies of lists used to identify customers or prospective
customers, and copies of toll slips for all telephone calls made by the broker
or dealer. This additional data would provide the Commission with more evi-
dence during a prosecution; the records of offers, moreover, might aid in-
vestigators in halting a boiler room campaign before any fraudulent trans-
actions had been completed. The provision seems sufficiently complete to
frustrate attempts at evasion, readily revealed through phone bill-toll slip
discrepancies; the more extensive bookkeeping requirements may also lead to
more conscientious performance by salesmen in their dealings with customers.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to infer that the interference to which
the requirements may give rise could substantially slow the pace of sales
activity in the securities industry-an effect not necessarily limited to the tinder
$10 equities which are directly affected. The extent of this impact is admittedly
speculative; yet the necessity of the bookkeeping requirements, if the proof
advantages of the rule are to be obtained, calls for careful consideration in
evaluation of the entire program.
Exemptions alleviate the most severe problems of the bookkeeping provision.
Transactions on national exchanges, transactions in newly issued securities
for which prospectuses are available, and transactions with brokers, dealers,
and institutional and regular customers are wholly exempted. 0 The absence
of a bookkeeping exemption for unsolicited, isolated, inadvertent and excused
transactions 91 is readily explained by the necessity of obtaining evidence to
prove that any questioned act is within the relevant transaction exemptions.
Bookkeeping exemptions for traded securities are not based on the disclosure
and income criteria of the offer or sale exemption,92 but go only to transactions
on national exchanges. This difference may embody a recognition of the burden
bookkeeping requirements would put on the immense daily flow of business in
stock traded on the national exchanges and of the small likelihood that success-
ful boiler rooms are operating through exchange transactions.
Even with the burden thus narrowed, the combined effect of record keeping
88. See para. (d) of proposed Rule 15c2-6, supra note 59.
89. 17CFR240.17(a)-3 (1949).
90. See para. (d) and exemptions (1) and (2) thereto, proposed Rule 15c2-6, supra
note 59.
91. Which transactions are exempted from the offer and sale portion of the rule, id. at
paras. (a) (2), (a) (3), and (b).
92. Id. at paras. (a) (1) and (a) (4).
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requirements and transaction prohibitions may indicate that the probability of
success in eliminating boiler room operations is not worth the price of inhibi-
tions upon those legitimate market transactions which depend upon speed and
informality for their success. The difficulties of the proposed rule arise from
its focus upon physical events rather than the fraudulent nature of transaction;
its exemptions pinpoint the market area in which boiler room activity is most
likely to occur, but then fail to distinguish between those transactions which
in fact honestly fulfill disclosure requirements and those which, in the manner
of all frauds, do not. The extent of the problem thus posed cannot be said
to be demonstrated beyond the level of plausability on the basis of available
facts, but the vigorous critical reaction which the measure has received in
reputable financial circles and the ambivalence of SEC espousal suggest that
however leniently the rule would be interpreted, it would present serious curbs
on legitimate conduct.
ALTERATIVES TO THE PROPOSED RULE
Partially reflecting its own uncertainty regarding the proposed rule, the
SEC in April transferred to Congress a large share of the burden of inquiring
into devious securities marketing techniques.03 Presumably, the proposed rule
will be under congressional consideration, and no doubt concurrent or alter-
native methods of controlling boiler room type activities wil also be studied.04
Rather than focusing on certain incidents in the flow of securities business, as
the proposed rule does, the problem might be approached at other points--by
placing emphasis on the riskiness of particular issues, the needs of particular
customers, or a reinvigoration of the disclosure concept. But any alternative,
such as directing attention at issues, customers, or disclosure, must be evalu-
ated in the context of the proof difficulties which have led the SEC to the
radical approach of the proposed rule. If increased efficiency of anti-boiler
room administration is unobtainable or obtainable only at too high a price it
may be necessary to return to a functional emphasis, which contemplates the
solution of proof problems only to the extent consistent with an avoidance of
undue enlargement of the regulatory net.
93. An extensive report of market abuses, prepared by an SEC Committee and focus-
ing upon shortcomings in the securities industry and in the self-regulatory authorities, was
referred to Congress for analysis and hearings, SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MAR-
xrs, chs. I-IV, IX (April 3, 1963) ; N.Y. Times, April 4, 1963, p. 1, col. 4; Wall Street
Journal, April 4, 1963, p. 3, col. 1. See also the Commission's endorsement of the Com-
mittee's recommendations, SEC, Special Market Study Release No. 25, April 30, 1963; N.Y.
Times, April 30, 1963, p. 1, col. 4.
94. If the rule proposed by the SEC fails to be adopted, it will not be the first time
that a sweeping regulation suggested by the Commission did not become effective. A rule
proposed in 1942 by the Commission which would have required every dealer executing a
purchase or sale over-the-counter to disclose the best independent bid and asked price as-
certainable was, upon later consideration, shelved by the SEC. SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 3940, April 2, 1947. This proposal was dusted off last month and presented
in a new form, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1963, p. 46, col. 4.
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One possible modification of the proposed rule would be to empower the
SEC, like some state commissions, 5 to select on the basis of their promotional
or highly speculative nature which issues would be subject to the burden of a
boiler room regulation. Such selection might appear to be no more than an
extension of the principle by which profit-making stocks were selected for
exemption. 96 But inquiry into the substantive character of particular issues
would involve the SEC in a form of legitimation which does not go directly to
the issue of fraud. And whatever the merits of such state control, the basic
philosophy of the federal securities acts is one of disclosure, not of substantive
regulation.97 Not only does the SEC not pass upon the merits of securities,
but it is a crime for an issuer to suggest that it has approved his securities."
Passing on the merits is too much like a guarantee; even the soundest of stocks
is subject to watering by high pressure techniques, 9 and SEC substantive
selection would in no way curb this. There are sound policy bases in a free
market economy for reluctant exercise of paternalistic concern beyond the
degree necessary to render the investor equal to the choices he must make.
Louis Loss has already suggested what might be the general reaction to
SEC substantive regulation: "For myself . . . I shudder at the thought of
giving a federal agency life-and-death power over virtually the entire industry
of the country by subjecting all public financing to such vague tests as 'fair,
just and equitable' or 'sound business principles.' "100
95. See 1 Loss, SEcuPRrms REGULATION 56 n.149 (2d ed. 1961). One of the most
extreme examples of substantive regulation is the California statute, CAL. CORP. CoDE §
25500. No company may offer or sell its stock, with certain exceptions, until it has first ap-
plied for and secured from the Corporation Commissioner a permit authorizing it to do so,
Ibid. Permits are issued only after the Commissioner has determined
that the proposed plan of business of the applicant and proposed issuance of securi-
ties are fair, just, and equitable, and that the applicant intends to transact its business
fairly and honestly, and that the securities that it proposes to issue and the method to
be used by it in issuing or disposing of them are not such as, in his opinion, will work
a fraud upon the purchaser ...
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25507. At least fifteen states apply the "fair, just, and equitable" standard.
1 Loss, op. cit. supra.
96. See para. (a) (1) (A) of proposed Rule 15c2-6, ,vpra note 59.
97. See generally 1 Loss, SEcuPITIzs REGULATION 121-131 (2d ed. 1961).
98. An SEC rule requires that a caveat be printed in large capital letters on the front
cover of every prospectus:
THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION NOR HAS THE COMMISSION
PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPEC-
TUS. ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL
OFFENSE.
Securities Act of 1933, Reg. C, Art. 2, Rule 425.
99. See note 73 supra.
100. Loss, The Role of Government in the Proleclion of Investors, Address delivered
at the Mexico Stock Exchange, June 6, 1957, p. 12. "Fair, just, and equitable" is the test
applied in at least fifteen states. 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 95, at 56 n. 149.
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A second alternative approach, elements of which are present in the "regular
customer" concept of the proposed rule, would stress suitability of particular
shares for particular customers. The suitability approach, now under study by
the SEC and Congress,10 ' is already in force under Article III, Section 2 of the
National Association of Securities Dealers Rules of Fair Practice:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of facts, if
any, disclosed by such customer . . . as to his financial situation and
needs.
0 2
The concept appears to impose three duties upon the broker: to know his
customer, 0 3 to know the securities, 04 and to accommodate the one to the
other. The SEC has both recognized its relevance and shown its potentialities
for boiler room regulation in stating that its clear purpose
would be defeated if it were construed as permitting a broker or dealer
to engage in a practice of recommending low price speculative securities
to unknown customers-a practice which by its nature involves a high
probability thft the recommendation will not be suitable to at least some
of the persons solicited-without any knowledge of or attempt to obtain
information concerning the customer's other security holdings, his finan-
cial situation, and his needs so as to be in a position to judge the suitabil-
ity of the recommendation.'0 3
As far as the SEC is concerned, then, the salesman 100 has an affirmative duty
under the NASD rule. The broker or dealer should not merely merchandise
a product: he must at least "attempt to obtain" the information from the
customer, fulfill the implicit duties to know the security, its financial status
and prospects, and to evaluate the investor's financial needs, recommending
only those securities which there are "reasonable grounds" to believe will fit
those needs.
While a bookkeeping rule-requiring broker records on the customer's oc-
cupation and investment goals-would facilitate enforcement, as the Com-
mission recently suggested,10 7 the objections to a suitability approach go be-
101. SEC, SPEcIAL. STUDY or SEcuIrTEs MARKETs, ch. III B, 147, 148, 183, 186 (April
3, 1963) ; N.Y. Times, April 4, 1963, p. 40, col. 4; April 30, 1963, p. 42, col. 8.
102. Gerald M. Greenberg, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6320, July 21,
1960, p. 3, n. 5. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. will hereinafter be
referred to as NASD.
103. Ibid.; Boren & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6367, Sept. 19, 1960.
104. Both duties are referred to in the recent SEC report, SEC, SPEcIA STUDY o7
SEcuRITms MARxns, ch. III B, 147-48 (April 3, 1963). Cf. Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d
702, 711-20, 725-27 (9th Cir. 1961), a case involving an insurance agent who peddled a
policy in "reckless disregard" of its suitability for a particular customer.
105. Gerald Mf. Greenberg, SEC Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 6320, July
21, 1960, p. 6.
106. The terms salesman, broker, or dealer could be used interchangeably. The respo,.si-
bility would belong to whoever contacts the customer.
107. SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIEs MARKETS, ch. III B, p. 186 (April 3, 1963);
N.Y. Times, April 30, 1963, p. 42, col. 8.
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yond the obvious difficulties of proof; in particular it seems to present problems
identical to those of the "selected security" approach.10 8 Thus, what constitutes
"reasonable grounds" would remain uncertain until expounded by the Com-
mission and courts in case-by-case adjudication. Although it might seem rea-
sonable for a broker to recommend a "safe" security to a customer who cannot
afford speculation or to recommend a "risk" security to a customer willing and
financially able to gamble, 10 9 the basis of such judgments as "safe," "growth,"
"risk," and "financially able" depend upon the broker's expertise. If the SEC
can find no standards to evaluate the broker's judgment of "suitability," other
than his "reasonableness" or "good faith," then an SEC determination of
"unsuitability" would be merely a post hoc substitution of the Commission's
value judgment for the broker's. Thus, the SEC would, again, be forced to
make value judgments about the merits of a security, and would have to
engage in the difficult task of evaluating the broker's recommendations to his
customer, or the good faith of his possibily frustrated inquiry into the con-
sumer's needs. Although such rules may be appropriate for self-regulatory pro-
fessional associations such as the NASD, they do not seem appropriate for SEC
adoption. And that the SEC compels the NASD to administer the rule for
it,110 in light of the Commission review which would then attach,"' does not
seem to answer this objection.
If the proof advantages of the proposed rule would be, as feared, purchased
only at too dear a price, the most fruitful approach to the boiler room problem
and the professional malaise which it signifies may well be a reinvigoration of
the disclosure concept through careful definition of the professional's re-
sponsibility under the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts.11 2 Such a
development would stress investigation and transmission, at least in broker-
dealer solicited transactions, 11 3 since disregard of those duties is the source
108. See text at note 97 mpra.
109. Reputable broker-dealers probably follow such general guidelines. For instance,
expert witness Harold E. Wood, a Minnesota investment banker and one time head of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, told a federal court that in his experience there
were three types of customers:
One is the person who wants ... safety of income .... [Hie can't afford specula-
tion .... And then you have the customer who is not interested in income. He has
plenty of outside income. He is interested in growth, so he buys the type of stock like
Minnesota Mining, and then you have a third type of person who is. say the business-
man who can afford to take a risk; and he says, I want to buy, not a quality growth
stock or an income stock of quality, I want to gamble. And he is the sort of person
to whom you sell Texota, for example....
Transcript of Proceedings, p. 56, United States v. Pandolfo (D. N.D. Sept. 28, 1959).
110. N. Y. Times, May 5, 1963, Sec. I, p. 1, col. 2.
111. 52 Stat. 1073 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(g) (1958).
112. Primarily § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (2)
(1958). See note 40 mspra.
113. For proof purposes, the SEC report recommends that a rule be adopted requiring
"that every retail transaction be designated 'solicited' or 'unsolicited' in the permanent
records of a broker-dealer; that all customer complaints be kept in a single file and available
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of boiler room success."14 A pair of recent SEC decisions demonstrate the
shape such a development might take. In Mac Robbins & Co." 5 the SEC
suspended two securities salesmen who had been involved in a boiler room
operation and had failed to disclose easily ascertainable adverse information
about the stock promoted.116 The Commission held that the salesmen were
obligated to familiarize themselves with sales materials distributed by their
employer; furthermore, if these materials appear upon their face to be incomplete
or an unfair presentation of the significant facts respecting the security of-
fered 117 the salesmen could not rely upon the information. The decision in
Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc."8 put similar responsibilities upon the research
for inspection and examination by the Commission, the NASD, and the exchanges ...
SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcURITIs MARKE-s, ch. II B, p. 186 (April 3, 1963).
114. The SEC report to Congress, SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcwURTIEs M x,
(April 3, 1963), made extensive recommendations designed to increase investor protection
in the securities markets, including higher standards of investigation and disclosure, id. at
ch. III B, p. 187 (broker-dealer review of "available officially filed data prior to recom-
mending or selling specific securities"); ch. IV C, p. 26 (broker-dealer disclosure to
customers of information concerning unregistered distributions, including the amount of
securities, whether inventory or investment stock, and the offering price and underwriting
arrangements) ; ch. IX B, p. 128 (extension of reporting requirements of the Exchange Act
to issuers of unlisted securities).
Among other recommendations were the following: compulsory membership in a self-
regulatory body for all broker-dealers and investment advisors subject to Commissioner
jurisdiction, higher standards for entry into the securities business for both firms and
individuals, delegation of power to the SEC to bring administrative proceeding directly
against individuals involved in violations without first proceeding against the firm, id. at
ch. II F, pp. 19-24; tightened supervisory responsibilities of firm personnel and self-regula-
tory agencies, salesmen compensation less dependent on production, id. at ch. III B, pp.
185-88; increased attention to investment advisory practices, id. at ch. III C, pp. 120-22;
extension to 90 days of the period during which all dealers are required to deliver prospec-
tuses in the case of most "first" issues of common stock, id. at ch. IV B, p. 162. See also SEC,
Special Market Study Release No. 25, April 30, 1963.
115. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962, aff'd Berko v.
SEC, No. 27774, 2d Cir., April 9, 1963.
116. Brief for Petitioner, p. 9, Berko v. SEC, .snpra note 115.
117. Mac Robbins & Co., supra note 115, at 12; Berko v. SEC, supra note 115, at 1634.
Both decisions were based on the fact that Berko knew or should have known he was operat-
ing out of a boiler room. Ibid. Neither the Commission nor the Second Circuit characterized
the duties of a salesman in "a legitimate operation":
Whatever may be a salesman's obligation of inquiry ...where securities of an
established issuer are being recommended to customers by a broker-dealer who is not
engaged in misleading and deceptive high-pressure selling practices, that situation is
not presented here.
Mac Robbins & Co., supra at 12.
The Commission acted well within its mandate in concluding that the 'public interest'
requires that a salesman working out of a 'boiler room' be held to a higher duty to
prospective customers than a salesman working out of a legitimate sales operation...
Berko v. SEC, .rupra at 1634-35.
118. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, Feb. 11, 1963.
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staff of a broker-dealer,119 concluding: "in his fabulist role [the analyst's] ac-
tivities were no less reprehensible and no less willful," than if a salesman had
made similar statements orally; "indeed, the market letter was designed to
reach a much wider audience than the oral statements of a salesman.1 120 Thus,
the suggestion was made that brokerage employees at all levels share duties
of both investigation and transmission of information under the anti-fraud
provisions.
Stressing high standards reflecting the quasi-professional status of the
securities field may seem to present considerable problems since it carries the
concept of fraud beyond its normal reaches, even in SEC enforcement, 12'
through an affirmative requirement of investigation. Inflexible respect for
these standards might burden the industry as heavily as the bookkeeping re-
quirements of the proposed rule, and problems of proving infractions will
be more severe than those under the SEC proposal, although perhaps less
stringent than under the anti-fraud rules, if the elements of investigation and
disclosure are clearly defined. However, the problems of selecting what is
material to investigation and to disclosure are not inconsiderable. Certainly
brokers cannot be expected to maintain as complete a picture of the issuer as
the issuer's accountant, nor to disclose as much information as is required by
an SEC prospectus. It seems clear that such characteristics of a security as
the financial status and dividend policy of the issuer should be investigated.
Data required by the SEC in a registration statement 122 and information pub-
lished by investment advisory services would be pertinent, including the is-
suer's productivity quotient, managerial experience, and existing and potential
markets. How much of this must be disclosed is limited by the resources of the
securities industry and the utility of the information to the customer. Even if
the inefficiency of total disclosure would not toll the end of the securities
business, the bulk of data could not be assimilated by the average customer.
Nevertheless, certain negative factors which would have a determinative
weight in -the customer's decision should be disclosed. For instance, a customer
should be on notice that a recommended issuer has suffered recent losses, or
a security's price-earnings ratio is high. Although losses and other apparently
negative factors may be counterbalanced by favorable elements, 128 the SEC-
by listing certain factors which must always be disclosed-would provide
for notice to the customer while avoiding the difficulties of substantive review
of the broker's judgment.
119. Id.at 7-10.
120. Id. at 10.
121. For a comparison of securities fraud concepts and common law deceit, see 3
Loss, SEcuRrrIIs REGULATION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961).
122. 48 Stat. 88 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1958). The SEC report to Congress recom-
mends that broker-dealers be obliged to consult "available officially filed data prior to
recommending or selling specific securities." SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECUITIES MAhUMTS,
ch. III B, p. 187 (April 3, 1963).
123. Depending upon a variety of other factors, the security may still be a good pur-
chase, if, for instance, the issuer was just awarded a government contract.
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If such responsibilities to investigate and disclose 124 could exist in a workable
system of approaching securities fraud problems generally, administrative
questions would still remain concerning how contours of the duties would be
clarified. A method of developing criteria for general duties of investigation and
disclosure may be found in the SEC's recent release in the Volkswagonwcr: "
matter. The release called to the attention of the securities market the need to
describe certain possibly negative features respecting Volkswagonwerk stock,
arising out of its foreign origin. The release indicates a mode of procedure
because it treats a specific situation where disclosure of certain types of facts
was thought to be essential. Moreover, direction by release seems better suited
than the formalistic rule-making procedure for establishing categories in which
investigation and discl6sure would be required. It avoids both the rigidity of
rule-making and the uncertainty of case-by-case development while aiding
measurably in the understanding of the elements material to investigation and
disclosure. A series of releases, developing concepts of investigation and dis-
closure over a substantial period of time, might mediate with greater sensitivity
between the freedom the market requires and the protection which seems es-
sential to the purchaser.
124. Brokerage personnel would have separate but interrelated duties regarding investi-
gation and disclosure. The controlling officer of a firm should bear the responsibility of
primary inquiry into characteristics of the issuing company, and of distributing to his
salesmen a list of possible adverse factors, which the salesman would be under a duty to dis-
close to customers. The salesman would be further compelled to analyze the memorandum
from the controlling officer in accordance with the requirements of Mac Robbins and
Heft, Kahn & Infante. See notes 115 and 118 .supra. Because a salesman's misrepresenta-
tions can cause the loss of the firm's registration, Securities Exchange Act § 15(b), 49 Stat.
1378 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958), controlling officers should recognize a necessity
to improve training and supervision, as well as to conduct responsible investigations of
issuers and disseminate complete lists of adverse factors to the salesmen.
125. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6525, April 12, 1961:
The Commission was made aware that transactions may be effected in V.W. shares
in this country by a notice circulated by the Foreign Securities Committee of the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., which indicates among other things that
V.W. shares were eligible for trading in the over-the-counter market in Germany...,
that persons who purchase such shares in Germany will have no proof of ownership
other than the advice "from a German counter party" that these shares have been pur-
chased, and that the actual share certificates will probably not be available for
several months.
In addition to the above, the Commission understands that information generally
available for most securities traded in this country is unavailable as to V.AV. shares.
Statistical manuals "of ordinary usage contains no mention of the company or of
the shares; there is no material on file with the Commission, nor, as far as is lown,
with any other agency; and balance sheets, profit and loss statements, earnings,
reports, etc., are not available.
Persons effecting transactions in these securities, particularly brokers and dealers,
should be careful to avoid misstatements with respect to the securities and the com-
pany, and if, as appears, there is an unusual lack of pertinent information necessary
to reach an informed judgment as to the value of the securities, this fact would be
a material fact within the meaning of the anti-fraud provisions [of the Securities
Acts].
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